M a u r o S e n a t o r e
its force, is X itself, more precisely, a demand for presence that is associated to X and thus drives double and indefinite renvoi.
I I .
In "Force et signification" (originally published in 1963 and then included in L'écriture et la différence, 1967) , for the first time Derrida takes up the term renvoi to formalize the necessary relation that I described previously. In a key moment of the first part of this text, in which he highlights the metaphysical presuppositions of structuralism, Derrida dissociates writing from the classical, namely, Leibnizian, paradigm of divine creation. Furthermore, he welds this dissociation with the legacy of the concept of writing that Husserl elaborates in his late work Origin of Geometry (1936) . 3 At this point, Derrida recalls the earlier interpretation of the Origin that he had developed in the introduction to his French translation of Husserl's text (1962) . (Derrida 1978, 11) In § § 6-7 of his introduction, Derrida explains how geometric ideality ["just like that of all sciences," (1989, 76) ] passes from an originally intrapersonal emergence [namely, "the subjective egological evidence of sense," (1989, 63)] to its ideal objectivity through the mediation of language. In § 6, he points out that here Husserl, who "seems redescending [emphasis mine] toward language" and, therefore, more generally, toward culture and history, "does exactly the opposite" (Derrida 1989, 77) . "The return to language," Derrida continues, "brings to its final completion the purpose of the reduction itself" (1989, 77) , by liberating ideality from the psychological life of a factual individual community ["the inventor's head, " (1989, 78) ], in which it has emerged first, and by letting it be what it is (namely, other than itself). Therefore, language is "constitutive" with respect to sense, which, otherwise, would remain "ineffable and solitary" (Derrida 1989, 78) . 4 However, still another reduction is required to accomplish the passage of sense from the originally psychological formation to its historical constitution. In § 7, Derrida observes, in the wake of Husserl, that only writing permits the full accomplishment of the ideal objectivity of ideality, by unbinding the latter from an actual subjectivity in general, that of the inventor as well as of the community of his fellows, and thus by granting the ideality's traditionalization, that is, the possibility of its omnitemporal and omnispatial reactivation. (Derrida 2016, 50-51) The trace as a structure of renvoi is constituted by a synthesis, that is, by the irreducible relationship between the renvoi and the X that presents itself in the presence of the renvoi. Derrida designates this X (difference, the other, and the wholly other) as that which appears, presents, or announces itself as such:
by differing from itself, as an irreducible absence, or in the presence of something other. In other words, the synthetic structure of the trace bears within itself the process of double renvoi, by which X becomes itself at the same time
as is yet to come. In unfolding the synthetic structure of the trace, Derrida has recourse to the interpretation of Husserl's concept of the alter ego that he puts He [Husserl] is concerned with describing how the other as other, in its irreducible alterity, is presented to me. Is presented to me, as we will see later, as originary nonpresence. It is the other as other which is the ego's phenomenon: the phenomenon of a certain nonphenomenality which is irreducible for the ego as ego in general (the eidos ego). For it is impossible to encounter the alter ego in very form of the encounter described by Levinas, impossible to respect it in experience and in language, if this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in general). (Derrida 1978, 153-54) .
In the examined passage from De la grammatologie, Derrida designates the synthetic structure of double renvoi as the formula of the contestation of metaphysics. A few pages later, he makes this designation explicit by identifying metaphysics as the powerful desire to put an end to the process of renvoi at one time or another. We already know that double renvoi is irreducibly indefinite, that is, the renvoi of the renvoi to the renvoi, which carries with itself the structural relationship to X. Therefore, the evoked contestation of M a u r o S e n a t o r e 9 9 metaphysics consists in bringing to light what a metaphysical understanding of signification wishes to limit, the process of double and indefinite renvoi. Deconstructing the transcendental signified thus means pushing the renvoi that is at work in a system of signification to its limits, or, in other words, uncovering the structural law of signification. Metaphysics constitutes a reassuring limitation for the irreducible process by which an X presents itself only in the presence of a renvoi and, consequently, through indefinite and uninterrupted renvoi. From the perspective of double and indefinite renvoi, metaphysics wishes to neutralize the force of signification, namely, the structural demand or lack of X. I V .
In his last book, Voyous, Derrida conjures up the figure of the renvoi to describe a certain irreducible fate associated to the concept of democracy. In part 1 chapter 3, dedicated to "The Other of Democracy, the 'By Turns': Alternative and Alternation," he proposes a formalization able to account for the structural law that undergirds some historical vicissitudes of democracy. In particular, he takes up the case of the suspension of the electoral process in Algeria, which he presents as follows:
The Algerian government and a large part, although not a majority, of the Algerian people (as well as people outside Algeria) thought that the electoral process under way would lead democratically to the end of democracy. They thus preferred to put an end to it themselves. They decided in a sovereign fashion to suspend, at least provisionally, democracy for its own good, so as to take care of it, so as to immunize it against a much worse and very likely assault. (Derrida 2005, 33) According to Derrida's formalization of this case, here we have the "example"
of "an autoimmune pervertibility of democracy," by which "to immunize itself, to protect itself against the aggressor (whether from within or without), democracy thus secreted its enemies on both sides of the front" (2005, 35) . "Its only apparent options," Derrida continues, "remained murder and suicide;
but the murder was already turning into suicide, and the suicide, as always, let itself be translated into murder" (2005, 35) . At this point, the renvoi enters the scene. Derrida remarks that the formalized process "always consists in a 
text): reference, referral, deferral, sending off, send-off, putting off, remission, and so forth.
As we will see, the untranslatability of renvoi is a necessary effect of its double and indefinite structure. "If it would be ludicrous today to attempt a preface that really was a preface, it is because we know semantic saturation to be impossible; the signifying precipitation introduces an excess facing (un debord) ('that part of the lining which extends beyond the cloth,' according to Littre) that cannot be mastered; the semantic after-effect cannot be turned back into a teleological anticipation and into the soothing order of the future perfect; the gap between the empty 'form,' and the fullness of 'meaning' is structurally irremediable, and any formalism, as well as any thematicism, will be impotent to dominate that structure" (Derrida 1981, 20-21) .
8. For the determination of the sense of sense as a historical object (that is inscribed, namely, engraved in the world), see Derrida's introduction to Husserl's Origin: "If the sense of geometrical sense is Objectivity or the intention of Objectivity, if geometry is here the exemplary index of being scientific, and if history is the highest and most revelatory possibility for a universal history (the concept of which would not exist without it), then the sense of sense in general is here determined as object: as some thing that is accessible and available in general and first for a regard or gaze" (Derrida 1989, 64). 19. This text begins with the following remark: "Here we are touching upon the point of greatest obscurity, on the very enigma of differance, on precisely that which divides its very concept by means of a strange cleavage" (Derrida 1982, 19 
